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I. INTRODUCTION

The rule handed down by the Pennsylvania Superior Court in Hite
v. Falcon Partners, 1 that payment of delay rental alone under an oil and
gas lease cannot extend the length of the lease beyond the primary term,

* J.D., University of Akron School of Law, 2013; B.A. in Political Science, University of Akron,
2010.
1. 13 A.3d 942 (Pa. Super. 2011).
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should be adopted throughout the Appalachian region.2
New
technological advances in drilling techniques have made vast amounts of
natural gas trapped in the Marcellus and Utica3 shale beds reachable in
this area. 4 The prospect of reaching the gas in these formations has led
some commenters to refer to the United States as the “Saudi Arabia of
natural gas.” 5 The relatively recent development of leasing of mineral
rights in states overtop of these formations has resulted in widely
varying precedent and laws regarding oil and gas leases. 6
This Note will focus on the law of four states: New York,
Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia. The Background section of this
note will give a description of the developments in these states that have
rejuvenated the relevance of the interpretation of oil and gas leases in
this region and explain why this is an important area of the law today.
This section will also reveal the state of the laws regarding delay rental
payments. States in this group are organized according to their treatment
of the issue at hand. First, New York presents the strongest precedent
upholding the extension of an oil and gas lease through delay rental
payments. 7 Ohio law provides that a lease terminates at the end of the
primary term when no well is producing, even if delay rentals continue.8
West Virginia represents a state that is yet to definitively dispose of the
issue. 9 The Background will conclude with a brief review of the nature
of the habendum clause of a lease, which is typically the relevant part of
a lease regarding this issue.
The next section, the Statement of the Case, will include a synopsis
of the facts that led to Falcon. Although the court’s reasoning will be
more extensively examined in the Analysis section, the Statement of the
Case will briefly provide the bases of the court’s decision.

2. Id. at 948.
3. The Utica and Marcellus shale beds cover much of the same area. For simplicity, I will
refer to these states as the Marcellus States.
4. Joseph A. Dammel, Notes from Underground: Hydraulic Fracturing in the Marcellus
Shale, 12 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH 773, 774 (2011).
5. Marcellus Shale Gas: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On Energy and Natural Resources,
112th Cong. 62 (2011) (statement of Scott Rotruck, Vice president of Corporate Development,
Chesapeak Energy Corporation, Oklahoma).
6. Unlike many areas of law in the United States, the law of oil and gas leases was not based
on centuries-old precedent derived from English law. Martin refers to the way in which oil and gas
law was established as “largely home-grown, state-by-state, rather than imported.” Patrick H.
Martin, Unbundling the Executive Right: A Guide to Interpretation of the Power to Lease and
Develop Oil and Gas Interests, 37 NAT. RESOURCES J. 311, 312-315 (1997).
7. Ball v. Ball, 244 N.Y.S. 300, 304 (1930).
8. See infra Part II.B.(2).
9. See infra Part II.B.(3).
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The Analysis will be broken down into five main arguments in
support of a uniform law regarding delay rental provisions in leases in
this area. First, this section will demonstrate the importance of the
development of a uniform law in this region. The next part of the
Analysis shows why the very nature of the property right transferred in
an oil and gas lease disfavors the extension of the term by delay rental
payments. The third part will deal with the policy reasons for refusing to
allow delay rentals to extend a lease beyond its primary term. These
include recognition in each of these states of an implied or express
covenant of development in oil and gas leases and public policy
concerns with finding the most profitable use for property. Finally, this
policy argument will conclude with an analysis of the alternatives
available to the oil and gas lessee and why these alternatives further
prove that Falcon presents the best model law concerning delay rental.
II. BACKGROUND
A.

The Surfacing of the Marcellus Shale

The Marcellus shale formation, which runs beneath New York,
Pennsylvania, Ohio, West Virginia, and even parts of Maryland,
Virginia, Kentucky, and Tennessee, is not a new discovery. 10 However,
recent technological advances have made this vast source of natural gas
accessible. 11 These advances have made it feasible to use a technique
known as hydraulic fracturing 12 to drill deep down into the Marcellus
shale formation. 13 As a result, oil and gas companies have flocked to
these states, ready to invest billions of dollars in purchasing oil and gas

10. George A. Bibikos & Jeffrey C. King, A Primer on Oil and Gas Law in the Marcellus
Shale States, 4 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 155, 156 n.2 (2008-2009). Only small parts of
Maryland, Virginia, Kentucky, and Tennessee overlay the Marcellus Shale. Id. Accordingly, these
states will not be given great attention as their oil and gas laws are not likely to be greatly affected.
11. Id. at 156.
12. Hydraulic fracturing is a drilling technique that is used to extract “oil, natural gas,
geothermal energy, and even water” from below the earth’s surface. Hydraulic Fracturing
ENV’L
PROT.
AGENCY
(Oct.
31,
2011),
Background
Information,
U.S.
http://water.epa.gov/type/groundwater/uic/class2/hydraulicfracturing/wells_hydrowhat.cfm.
The
drilling method involves drilling down hundreds to thousands of feet below the surface, at which
point the drilling proceeds horizontally below the surface. Id. Chemicals and water are pumped
into the well at high pressure, causing the shale to break, or fracture. Id. Next, a “propping agent”
is used to prevent the fractures from closing up and allowing the now-free resources to flow out of
the earth. Id. The pressure from the formation then causes the water and chemicals used to create
the fractures to flow back out of the well, at which point they are disposed of. Id.
13. Bibikos & King, supra note 10, at 156.
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rights and tapping into this huge resource. 14 Many uninformed property
owners signed leases just before the boom at low prices and are now
looking for ways out of seemingly unfair leases.15 Gas companies are
doing everything in their power to preserve these “lowball” leases. 16
Consequently, these property owners are turning to the courts for
answers. 17
B.

Differing Perspectives: How Have These States Disposed of the
Issue of Delay Rental? 18

The states in question have all faced the issue of delay rentals, but
they have not all come to the same conclusion.
1. Extension of the Primary Term in an “Or” Lease: New York
New York has the least-developed oil and gas law among the states
relevant in the Marcellus discussion.19 Researchers examining New
York’s oil and gas laws in anticipation of the Marcellus boom have
referred to the state as essentially “a blank slate as to all significant oil
and gas lease issues.” 20 It is also the only state whose case law explicitly
allows for the payment of delay rental to extend a lease for as long as
14. ConocoPhillips is expected to invest $2 billion in natural gas in 2011; Exxon Mobil and
Royal Dutch Shell are also investing billions in shale gas products. Paul M. Barrett, Shale-Gas
Reserves Have Potential to Reignite U.S. Economy, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 3, 2011, 12:00 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-03/shale-gas-reserves-have-potential-to-reignite-u-seconomy.html.
15. Michael Rubinkam, AP Enterprise: Lowball Gas Drill Leases Haunt Pa., THE SEATTLE
TIMES
(July
23,
2011,
12:01
PM),
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2015706907_apusgasdrillinglowballleases.html.
16. Id.
17. See id. Rubinkam describes the plight of the Beinlichs, a Pennsylvania couple who sold
the oil and gas rights to their 117-acre parcel to a gas company for two dollars per acre. Id. Five
years later, near the expiration of the lease term, neighbors are receiving up to $7500 per acre as a
signing bonus. Id. The Beinlichs are now suing in federal court to challenge whether their leases
should continue. Id. See also Casey Junkins, Mineral Owners Sue Chesapeake: Claim Company
can’t Renew Leases for $5 per Acre, THE INTELLIGENCER/WHEELING NEWS REGISTER (May 16,
2011),
http://theintelligencer.net/page/content.detail/id/555132/Mineral-Owners-SueChesapeake.html?nav=5233 ( describing a class-action lawsuit filed by West Virginia landowners,
challenging the gas company’s claim that payment of delay rental extends the lease beyond the five
year primary term).
18. “Delay rental” is a fee paid to the lessor of property under an oil and gas lease for the
delay in production during drilling and development. BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed.
2010).
19. The issue of delay rentals is barely addressed in New York statutory law. See New York
General Obligations Law § 5-333(2) (McKinney 2005), which provides merely a timeline for
payment of the first delay rental after a new lease is signed.
20. Bibikos & King, supra note 10, at 191.
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such rental is paid. 21 In Ball v. Ball, 22 the court enforced a lease with a
one-year primary term based on the lessee’s payment of delay rental for
seven years. 23 The court limited its ruling to leases which contain the
“or” habendum clause construction.24 With new attention being given to
oil and gas rights in New York, this issue is likely to arise (and soon,
since litigation concerning old leases has already began). 25
2. Established Law: Delay Rental Provisions in Ohio
For over a century, the law in Ohio has been that delay rental has
been inadequate to extend a lease beyond a primary term. 26 The Ohio
Supreme Court has based its reasoning on the idea that the time period
set out in the habendum clause sets the term of the lease, and without
production at the expiration of this term, the lease terminates.27 The rule
in Ohio is similar to the law in states with much more developed oil and
gas law, such as Texas, 28 which has the most experience with oil and gas
leases of any state examined, 29 and New Mexico. 30
21. Ball v. Ball, 244 N.Y.S. 300, 304 (1930).
22. 244 N.Y.S. 300.
23. Id. at 303-04. The habendum clause of the lease in Ball authorized a lease “for the
‘purpose of mining and operating for oil and gas for the term of one year, and as much longer as the
rent for failure to commence operations is paid.’” Id. at 302. The court construed this clause as an
“or” clause (discussed infra Part II.C.), and states that “failure to develop does not authorize
termination.” Id. at 304.
24. Id. at 304. See infra Part II.C. for an analysis of the difference between “or” and “unless”
delay rental provisions.
25. See Wiser v. Enervest Operating, L.L.C., 803 F.Supp.2d 109, 111 (N.D. N.Y. 2011)
(addressing the failure of a lessee to pay delay rental during the primary term).
26. See Brown v. Fowler, 65 Ohio St. 507, 522 (1902) (holding that a lease that states that the
lease expires if no well is drilled in two years, unless delay rental payments of one-dollar per acre
are made in advance cannot extend a lease for as long as such payments are made, but expires when
no well is drilled at the end of the two year term).
27. Id. at 521.
28. See A. W. Walker, Jr., The Nature of the Property Interests Created by an Oil and Gas
Lease in Texas, 8 TEX. L. REV. 483, 513 (1930) (claiming that Texas law provides that a lease
cannot continue “after the expiration of the fixed term by the payment of delay rentals” even though
a literal reading would imply the lease could be continued in this way forever).
29. Pennsylvania was actually home to the very first oil well, drilled in Crawford County in
1859. Hite v. Falcon Partners, 13 A.3d 942, 946 (Pa. Super. 2011).
30. Humphreys v. Fletcher, 204 P. 70, 70 (N.M. 1922). In Humphreys, the lease provided for
a two year term and stated that it would expire after one year if no well was drilled, unless delay
rental was paid. Id. The payment of delay rental would extend the time for drilling for twelve more
months, and this lease explicitly stated that further payments “should further defer the drilling for
like periods.” Id. Even with this express provision allowing extension beyond the primary term, the
New Mexico Supreme Court ruled that the term of the lease supersedes the rental period. Id. In this
case, the term of the lease was two years, regardless of whether the rental period could be extended.
Id.
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3. Drilling for Answers: West Virginia’s Need for a Rule
West Virginia has updated its oil and gas statutory law regarding
delay rental fairly recently. 31 In applying this statute, the West Virginia
Supreme Court has agreed that the legal presumption of abandonment of
a well is not created when delay rental has been paid, 32 as long as this
payment is agreed to by the lessor and lessee and designed to keep the
lease in effect or extend its term. 33 In Howell v. Appalachian Energy
Inc., 34 the West Virginia Supreme Court upheld a ruling that wells and
equipment had been abandoned when no royalties or rentals were paid to
the lessors over an eight-year span. 35 The question is yet to be decided 36
as to whether consistent payment of delay rental beyond the term of the
lease will extend a lease when the language of the lease can be read to
allow for such an extension. 37 Litigation is already arising which will
give West Virginia courts a chance to answer this question.38
Another important aspect of the analysis in West Virginia is the
state’s recognition of a no-term oil and gas lease. 39 In Wilson v. Reserve
31. See W. VA. CODE § 36-4-9a (West 2013) (stating that payment of delay rental in the
absence of production for twenty-four months overcomes the rebuttable presumption that a lease has
been abandoned).
32. Other instances preventing the creation of such a presumption include a lease for storage
purposes, interference by the owner of the gas or oil or his lessee, or inability to market the gas or
oil. Id.
33. Howell v. Appalachian Energy, Inc., 519 S.E.2d 423, 431 (W. Va. 1999).
34. 519 S.E.2d at 431.
35. Id. at 432.
36. This issue has been decided in West Virginia, but not as applied by the statute. Eclipse
Oil Co. v. South Penn Oil Co., 34 S.E. 923, 925-26 (W. Va. 1899). The Court refused to allow
delay rental to extend a lease, stating a lessee who enters an oil and gas lease with no intent to
develop the property should not be allowed to pay delay rental and later profit to the detriment of
the lessor. Id. The Court was not kind to the lessees, going so far as to say that the option to
explore or not “evidences a plain intention on their part not to explore for oil and gas” and
amounting such activity to fraud and “a blind to deceive the lessor.” Id.
37. According to the code, the terms of the lease must show that the delay rental is “designed
to keep an oil or gas lease in effect or extend its term” in order for such payment to extend the lease.
W. VA. CODE § 36-4-91. In Falcon, the term of the lease was for “(1) year . . . or as long as lessee
shall continue to pay lessors two ($2.00) dollars per acre as delayed rentals.” 13 A.3d 942, 944 (Pa.
Super. 2011). The question is yet to be determined in West Virginia as to whether such language is
“designed to keep an oil or gas lease in effect or extend its term.”
38. At least one class-action lawsuit is already pending in U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of West Virginia. Junkins, supra note 17. This case involves six property owners
who entered into leases in 2006 for five-dollars per acre. Id. These leases provided for a five-year
primary term, which ended in early 2011. Id. The gas company now claims they can keep these
leases in effect by paying the delay rental payments. Id. With gas companies now paying in excess
of $5,000 per acre and 156 such leases owned by one gas company in one region of West Virginia,
this case is likely to be the first of many concerning this and similar lease issues. Id.
39. Wilson v. Reserve Gas Co., 88 S.E. 1075, 1077 (W. Va. 1916).
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Gas Co., 40 the court upheld a lease that provided for a quarterly rental
absent drilling and that permitted “said gas company during the term for
which payments are made to drill or not to drill as it may elect.” 41 Six
years later, the West Virginia Supreme Court went even further, stating
that a lease with a term for ten years “and as much longer as the rental
for delay in operating is paid” also constituted a no-term lease. 42 West
Virginia courts will therefore have to determine whether delay rental
provisions in controverted leases fall under the statute as intended to
keep the lease in effect, whether they should be regarded as no-term
leases, or whether to follow the precedent of rulings like Falcon that the
tendering of delay rental does not extend the primary term of a lease.
C.

The Nature of the Habendum Clause in an Oil and Gas Lease:
“Or” vs. “Unless” Clauses

There is no standard form for a habendum clause in leases. 43
Although they differ greatly, some constructions have become fairly
common. The primary term in a habendum clause sets out the length of
time that the lessee has to put the property into production. 44 The
secondary term is usually contingent on the lessee producing oil and gas
during the primary term, and extends the period of time of the lease,
often for as long as gas or oil is produced in paying quantities.45
Delay rental provisions in a habendum clause commonly come in
one of two forms, the “or” form or the “unless” form. 46 Although the
difference in phraseology is small, the legal significance is great.47 The
“or” clause refers to a lease in which the lessee has a certain amount of
time to commence drilling or pay delay rental in lieu thereof.48 The “or”
clause is a condition subsequent, meaning that when the lessee fails to
40. 88 S.E. 1075.
41. Id. at 1076.
42. Todd v. Mfr.’s Light & Heat Co., 110 S.E. 446, 446 (W. Va. 1922). The habendum
clause continued: “This lease shall become null and void and all the rights thereunder shall cease
and determine unless one well shall be completed on the said premises within three months from the
date hereof, or unless the lessees shall pay at the rate of fifty and no dollars ($50) quarterly in
advance for each additional three months such completion is delayed from the time above
mentioned for the completion of said well until one well is completed.” Id. at 447.
43. A habendum clause is the portion of the lease that sets out how long the lease endures.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
44. Mohan Kelkar, The Effect of the Cessation of Production During the Secondary Term of
an Oil and Gas Lease, 22 TULSA L.J. 531, 532 (1987).
45. Id. at 532-33.
46. Walker, supra note 28, at 520-40.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 536.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2013

7

Akron Law Review, Vol. 46 [2013], Iss. 4, Art. 11
VOL. 46, NO. 4 - ARTICLE 10 RICHARDSON (DO NOT DELETE)

1140

AKRON LAW REVIEW

9/19/2013 3:26 PM

[46:1133

produce or pay delay rentals, the lessor may terminate the lease or waive
his right to terminate it.49 The “unless” clause provides that a nonproducing lease will automatically terminate at the end of the specified
time unless the lessee pays delay rental.50
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Hite v. Falcon Partners 51 arose from a group of similar leases
entered into by landowners and a gas company on either December 18,
2002, or October 30, 2003. 52 The habendum clause of each lease
provided as follows:
3. Term. Lessee has the right to enter upon the property to drill for oil
and gas at any time withinone [sic] (1) year from the date hereof and as
long thereafter as oil or gas or either of them is produced from the
Property, or as operations continue for the production of oil or gas, or
as Lessee shall continue to pay Lessors two ($2.00) dollars per acre
as delayed rentals, or until all oil and gas has been removed from the
53
Property, whichever shall last occur.

No action was ever commenced for the drilling on the plaintiffs’
properties. 54 However, the delay rental was paid each year. 55 In
December 2008, after five years without any development by Falcon, the
plaintiffs sent notice that the leases were terminated and filed the
action. 56 Falcon believed, and argued in the case, that the provision in
the contract allowed them to extend the lease into perpetuity simply by
paying the delay rentals.57
The court refused Falcon’s arguments, holding that these leases
expired automatically when the property was not in production of oil or
gas at the end of the one-year primary term. 58 By so ruling, the court
eliminated the possibility that a lease containing a primary term and a
secondary term could be extended beyond the primary term with
payment of the delay rentals alone. 59 In its concise explanation for the
49. Id. at 536-37.
50. Id. at 520-21.
51. 13 A.3d 942 (Pa. Super. 2011).
52. Id. at 944.
53. Id. (emphasis added to the delay rental provision).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 948.
59. Id. at 947-48. The court acknowledges that a lease may be read to create a perpetual term
when such an intention “is expressed in clear and unequivocal terms.” Id. However, it then
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ruling, the Court stated:
To find as Falcon urges, that it may pay delay rental indefinitely,
thereby denying Plaintiffs the opportunity to reap the financial benefits
of actual production, would be contrary to the decisions of our Courts,
at odds with the presumed intention of the parties in executing the
leases in the first place, and in stark contrast to the clear opinion of the
courts of Pennsylvania that the obligation to pay delay rentals is
60
intended to “spur the lessee toward development.”

Additionally, the nature of the property right granted by an oil and gas
lease discredited the argument that delay rental alone would extend the
lease. 61 Each of these bases for the decision in Falcon will be developed
and further analyzed below.62
IV. ANALYSIS
The Pennsylvania Superior Court has presented the most
appropriate standard when it comes to the payment of delay rentals.
While it acknowledges that a perpetual lease is possible, it shuts down
another way for lessees to extend a lease with just the mere payment of
delay rental beyond the primary term. 63
A.

The Need for a Uniform Law

The four states comprising the bulk of the Marcellus Shale
formation, New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia are in
need of a uniform law governing the ability of delay rentals to extend a
lease beyond the primary term. 64 In order to demonstrate the need for a
uniform law, we will use a hypothetical lease based on true facts, to
examine the vastly differing impact a lease may have in these similarly-

proceeds to state that there would be no need for a one-year lease term if the parties intended for the
lease to extend through perpetuity by the payment of the $2.00 per acre delay rental. Id. at 948. It
necessarily follows that in any lease containing a primary and secondary term, delay rentals alone
will not extend the lease beyond the initial primary term. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 949. Falcon contended that payment of delay rental created a vested property right.
Id. Under oil and gas law, the oil and gas lease conveys an inchoate title to these minerals which is
only perfected when the property is put into production. Id.
62. See infra Part IV.
63. Falcon, 13 A.3d at 948. Falcon reiterates the rule that a lessee cannot postpone
development indefinitely, even in the case of a no-term lease, showing consistency to the principle
that a lease cannot be held perpetually by the lessee without development. Id.
64. See supra Part II.B. for more details regarding the conflicting laws of these states.
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situated states. 65
1. The Terms and Habendum Clause
Our hypothetical lease covers a 1,000-acre farm. 66 The lease is for
a term of five years, beginning January 1, 1967, and for as long
thereafter as the leased premises are operated in the search for or
production of oil or gas, or as long as the lessee pays delay rentals in the
amount of one dollar per acre annually, whichever shall last occur.67 As
further consideration, the lessor is to receive a 1/8 (12.5%) royalty on all
gas or oil produced from the property. The lessee has the option to
cancel this contract by paying one dollar at any time to the lessor. Using
these delay rental terms, we will examine the effect that such a lease will
have on the lessor in Ohio and Pennsylvania, 68 West Virginia, and New
York.
2. Rags to Riches: Our Farmer Becomes a Millionaire in Ohio or
Pennsylvania
Applying the rule that the payment of delay rental alone is not
enough to extend an oil and gas lease beyond the primary term, the
farmer may cancel the lease and refuse to accept any further delay rental
payments. 69 Free to enter into a new oil and gas lease, our farmer will
discover that his property is quite valuable. Using fairly modest
numbers by today’s standards, we will assume our farmer negotiates a
new five-year lease for $5,000 per acre as a signing bonus plus eighteen
percent royalties on all oil or gas produced from the property. 70 Months
after signing this lease, our farmer will receive a $5 million bonus check;
money the farmer retains regardless of whether drilling commences

65. This portion of the analysis is based on an actual lease executed in 1967.
66. The actual lease covers 960 acres. For math purposes, we have rounded this number up
to 1,000 acres.
67. The gas company has been faithfully making the yearly installments.
68. Due to the similarity in the laws of Ohio and Pennsylvania, they will be grouped together
using the Rule laid down in Falcon.
69. It is important to note the form of the habendum clause used in this example. The “or”
clause is used, rather than the “unless” clause. As previously stated, the “or” clause gives the lessor
the opportunity to cancel the lease, while leases with an “unless” clause terminate automatically if
the condition is not met. If the habendum clause here had been an “unless” clause, the farmer
would be free to lease the premises because technically the lease terminated by its own terms. See
supra Part II.C.
70. See Junkins, supra note 17 (claiming that signing bonuses in West Virginia’s Northern
Panhandle are as high as $5,000 per acre).
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within the term of the agreement. 71 If drilling does commence and is
successful, he will reap the further benefits of receiving nearly one-fifth
of the income from a producing well.
3. State of Uncertainty: West Virginia
Under West Virginia law, if the terms of the lease providing for the
delay rental can be defined as “designed to keep an oil or gas lease in
effect or extend its term,” there is no way for the farmer to cancel the
lease. 72 Neither the statute nor the case law provides guidance for how
to determine whether a clause is designed to keep the lease in effect.
The lease in question uses a common form, similar to the “or” form used
in Falcon, which states that the lease continues “so long as the leased
premises are operated in the search for or production of oil and gas, or as
long as the lessee pays delay rentals.”73 Using the literal meaning of the
words, it appears that payment of delay rentals could extend the lease
indefinitely. It seems highly unlikely that legislators in West Virginia
intended to create the possibility of a perpetual lease with no production
requirements, so it will be interesting to see how the law develops in this
state.
4. A Fracking Waste: The Disincentive to Drill in New York
New York’s authorization of a lease which can be extended through
the mere payment of delay rentals has devastating effects on our farmer.
Rather than entering a new lease for a multi-million dollar profit, the
farmer is forced to accept annual $1,000 rental checks for so long as the
lessee so chooses, even into perpetuity. Although New York is hesitant
to allow gas companies to use fracking within the state, its law on this
issue greatly benefits these companies.74 Gas companies can use the
“or” form in drafting leases to ensure that a lease will continue forever at

71. See Elisabeth N. Radow, Homeowners and Gas Drilling Leases: Boon or Bust?, 83-DEC
N.Y. ST. B.J. 10, 16 (Nov./Dec. 2011) (describing the process by which lessors are commonly
compensated upon signing an oil and gas lease).
72. W. VA. CODE § 36-4-9a (West 2013).
73. Supra Part IV.A.(1).
74. Hydraulic fracturing in New York has been the subject of great debate. In 2009,
lawmakers passed legislation permanently banning fracking, but Governor David A. Paterson
vetoed the bill, instead placing a temporary ban on fracking until more research could be done.
Danny Hakim & Nicholas Confessore, Cuomo Moving to End a Freeze on Gas Drilling, N.Y.
TIMES, July 1, 2011, at A1. Earlier this year, Governor Andrew M. Cuomo announced his support
for lifting the ban and allowing drilling to commence. Id.
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little cost to the company and at a great cost to the individual lessors.75
Based on the above example alone, there is clearly a need for a
uniform delay rental law in states dealing with oil and gas leases. Aside
from the difficulty of having to know the differing rules in each state,
gas companies entering into leases are faced with the uncertainty of
ambiguous and undeveloped laws. Sometimes, their leases will
terminate automatically when no gas is produced at the end of the
primary term, regardless of whether further delay rentals are paid to the
lessor. 76 In another case, payment of delay rental in the absence of
cancellation by the lessor might extend their rights under the contract.77
In still other situations, continued rental payments by the gas company
even when no well is drilled at the primary term will keep the lease in
full force. 78 These differing outcomes will require oil and gas
companies to not only know the varying laws of the state, but also to pay
scrupulous attention to court decisions and make certain that they abide
by each state’s ever-changing laws.
B.

The Nature of the Property Right Transferred in an Oil and Gas
Lease

Oil and gas leases are unusual in that they are not technically leases
at all. In some jurisdictions, these “leases” actually transfer a property
right in the oil and gas from the lessor to the lessee in fee simple
determinable. 79 The lease then functions as a way to sever the estate of
the surface from that of the minerals below.80 The lessor retains
possession of the surface estate in fee simple, while the lessee takes title
to the oil and gas in fee simple determinable. 81 This interest is a vested
interest, meaning it does not violate the rule against perpetuities. 82
However, this vested interest is subject to divestment if a stated event

75. Over the course of our hypothetical, the gas company will have paid the farmer $44,000
in delay rental. The company could hold onto the 1,000 acres for 5,000 years until they will have
paid the $5 million to the farmer that he would likely receive in a new lease.
76. See supra Part III.B.(2).
77. See supra Part III.B.(3).
78. See supra Part III.B.(1).
79. Walker, supra note 28, at 483 (describing Texas law). See also Snyder Brothers, Inc. v.
Peoples Natural Gas Co., 676 A.2d 1226, 1230 (Pa. Super. 1996) (stating that a lease of mineral
rights in Pennsylvania transfers the land to the lessee in fee simple determinable). West Virginia
also recognizes a determinable fee interest in oil and gas rights. McCullough Oil, Inc. v. Rezek, 346
S.E.2d 788, 794 (W. Va. 1986).
80. Walker, supra note 28, at 483.
81. Id.
82. Snyder Brothers, 676 A.2d at 1230.
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occurs. 83 The interest retained by the lessor is known as a possibility of
reverter, because at the occurrence of the stated event, title reverts back
to the lessor. 84 More simply, the lessor retains full ownership rights to
the surface of his property, while the gas company owns all the oil and
gas. If a certain event occurs as set out in the lease, the owner of the
surface automatically reacquires title to the minerals without any further
action. This is the view in the majority of states.85
For a practical example of how this interest works, let’s take
another look at our hypothetical lease from the example above. 86 The
relevant portion of the habendum clause specifies that the lease shall
endure for “as long thereafter as the leased premises are operated in the
search for or production of oil or gas, or as long as the lessee pays delay
rentals in the amount of one ($1.00) dollar per acre annually, whichever
shall last occur.” 87 In jurisdictions recognizing an oil and gas lease as a
fee simple determinable, the stated event which would divest the interest
of the lessees is the cessation of production or the cessation of rental
payments. Therefore, as soon as rental payments stop in the primary
term or the production or search for gas stops during the secondary term,
the lease terminates automatically without any action necessary by either
party.
The question necessarily arises as one examines this fee simple
determinable classification of the interest transferred in an oil and gas
lease as to whether the outcome in Falcon was correct. If a lessee
acquires vested property rights in fee simple determinable, and the
contract expressly states that the interest will continue as long as delay
rentals are paid, should not payment of annual delay rentals prevent title
from reverting back to the lessor? At least one jurisdiction, Texas,
applying this law has come up with an interesting, albeit faulty,
solution—that the purpose of an oil and gas lease (to explore for,
develop, and produce gas or oil) constitutes a special limitation on the
estate. 88 Classification of a limiting clause as a special limitation means

83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Bibikos & King, supra note 10, at 172. For more information about the states that
classify an oil and gas interest as a fee simple determinable, see id. at 159, n. 15.
86. See supra Part IV.A.(1).
87. Supra Part IV.A.(1)
88. Walker, supra note 28, at 494 (restating the rule announced in Stephens County v. MidKansas Oil and Gas Co., 254 S.W. 290 (Tex. 1923) and Waggoner Estate v. Sigler Oil Co., 19
S.W.2d 27 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1929)); see also McCullough Oil, Inc. v. Rezek, 346 S.E.2d 788, 797 (W.
Va. 1986) (holding that the “thereafter” provision in a habendum clause constitutes a special
limitation).
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that the estate automatically terminates at the occurrence of a specific
event. 89 In other words, the interest transferred is a fee simple
determinable, but the purpose of the lease becomes one of the stated
events that will terminate the lease.
The significance of this
classification is that in the event that the lessee is not engaged in
exploration, development, or production after the primary term, the title
to the property automatically reverts to the lessor, even if delay rentals
are paid. 90
The court in Falcon refused this analysis. In the case of the lease in
Falcon, the fee would divest when the last of the following occurred:
ceasing production of gas or oil, discontinuing the two dollar per acre
rentals, or removing all of the oil and gas from the property. 91 Under a
literal reading of that clause, it would appear that the fee simple
determinable would not divest if the delay rentals are paid, even after the
end of the primary term. 92 The Falcon court found that the property
right transferred to the lessee under a oil and gas lease is not a fee simple
determinable, but rather an inchoate right, that becomes vested when the
property is brought into production. 93 Failure to bring the property into
production meant that the property right never vested. 94 Under Texas
law, the court’s decision would be the same, but based instead on a
violation of a special limitation—the purpose to explore for, develop, or
produce oil and gas. 95
At least one researcher 96 has criticized the Texas Supreme Court’s
reasoning in Stephens County v. Mid-Kansas Oil and Gas Co. 97 Texas’s
approach of classifying the purpose of an oil and gas lease as “oil and
gas exploration, development and production” is flawed. Texas law
recognizes that there is an implied covenant to develop a leased property
with reasonable diligence.98 This creates inconsistency among the duties
of a lessee. 99 As a result of these conflicting policies, “there is no duty
on the lessee to develop the premises at all, but there is a duty on the
lessee to develop the premises with reasonable diligence.”100 Therefore,
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Walker, supra note 28, at 484.
Id. at 485.
Hite v. Falcon Partners, 13 A.3d 942, 944 (Pa. Super. 2011).
Id.
Id. at 949.
Id.
Walker, supra note 28, at 484.
Id. at 493.
254 S.W. 290, 292 (Tex. 1923).
Texas Pacific Coal & Oil Co. v. Barker, 6 S.W.2d 1031, 1035 (Tex. 1998).
Walker, supra note 28, at 502.
Id.
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when a lessee does nothing after the execution of the lease, the lease will
be forfeited as a violation of the special limitation.101 However, if the
lessee begins working on the premises, but violates his duty to develop
the premises with reasonable diligence, he will be liable for money
damages to the lessor. 102 Clearly, there is a need for a bright line rule
eliminating the legal fiction that the purpose of the lease imposes a
special limitation on a lessee’s rights.103
New York presents a possible solution to the classification of the
purpose of an oil and gas lease as a special limitation. 104 In Ball v.
Ball, 105 New York rejected the idea that the purpose of the lease imposes
a limitation upon the lessee.106 Instead, the court held that the
obligations to explore and produce oil and gas are mere covenants. 107
Further, the court states that a breach of an implied covenant in New
York does not permit the lessor to terminate the lease. 108 Accordingly,
New York precedent supports a finding that a lessee can hold on to a
lease indefinitely, for both no-term leases 109 and term leases using the
“or” form, simply by paying delay rentals. 110
New York law, therefore, stands on the ground that the obligations
to explore and develop a lease are covenants, and the breach of these
covenants does not allow for forfeiture. Damages alone serve as the
remedy for a breach of the covenants.111 Unfortunately for a lessor,
stipulated rental payments are the contractual equivalent of damages for
a breach of these covenants. So long as these rentals are paid, the lessee
has no remedy in law or equity. Perhaps even more discouraging is that
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See id. at 503 (arguing that the Texas Supreme Court should reverse its decision that the
purpose of the oil and gas lease is for exploration, development and production). Walker suggests
that the most appropriate solution is for the court to explain that the purpose of an oil and gas lease
is actually “to secure a reasonably diligent development of the property for oil and gas.” Id. For the
reasons to be stated below, I believe the approach taken in Falcon of classifying the property
interest obtained by a lessee in an oil and gas lease as inchoate is the more rational approach.
104. See Ball v. Ball, 244 N.Y.S. 300, 304 (1930).
105. 244 N.Y.S. at 304.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 303. The court went on to distinguish this lease as a “wild cat” lease. Id. It defines
such a lease as different from one where “proven territory exists,” referring to the uncertainty of
drilling operations in states such as New York. Id.
109. See id. (stating that the lease in question for “one year ‘and as much longer as the rent for
failure to commence operations is paid’” contains no definite term and is valid so long as rent is
paid).
110. See id. at 304. Although the lease in question used an unusual “and” form, the court
classifies this type of clause as an “or” lease. Id.
111. Id.
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failure to pay rentals appears to be grounds only for a suit to recover
unpaid rentals. 112
The Pennsylvania Superior Court has presented us with yet another
method of analyzing the property right transferred in an oil and gas
lease. The court in Falcon rejected the idea that a vested right under a
fee simple determinable is created when an oil and gas lease is
executed. 113 Instead, the Superior Court states that the initial title
conveyed in an oil and gas lease is for the purpose of exploration only. 114
Execution of the oil and gas lease creates an inchoate title, which vests
only when the property is brought into production. 115 Only at this point
is a fee simple determinable created.116
States seeking a legal basis for deciding that oil and gas leases may
not be extended beyond the primary term by mere payment of delay
rentals, even when the lease can be interpreted to allow such extension,
should follow the lead of the Pennsylvania Superior Court in Falcon.
The idea that no title vests in an oil and gas lease until gas or oil is found
is not a revolutionary concept.117 Classification of this interest as an
inchoate title, which, upon discovery of oil and gas in paying quantities,
perfects into a fee simple determinable, preserves the lessee’s property
interest in the premises while not obliging the lessee to take any
affirmative action. If the lessee conducts no exploratory drilling within
the specified time and pays no delay rental, his title in the oil and gas
never vests. If he does pay delay rental throughout the primary term, but
does not find gas or oil in producing quantities, the lease expires at the
end of the primary term because no fee simple determinable was ever
perfected. If the lessee continues to pay delay rental after the term of the
lease expires, he is paying for a right he does not possess.

112. See id. (stating that a breach of the covenant to develop does not allow for termination).
113. Hite v. Falcon Partners, 13 A.3d 942, 945 (Pa. Super. 2011).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Some of the oldest oil and gas precedent in Pennsylvania establishes that title to oil and
gas is inchoate until gas or oil is discovered:
A vested title cannot ordinarily be lost by abandonment in a less time than that fixed by the statute
of limitations, unless there is satisfactory proof of an intention to abandon. An oil lease stands on
quite different ground. The title is inchoate, and for purposes of exploration only, until oil is found.
If it is not found, no estate vests in the lessee, and his title, whatever it is, ends when the
unsuccessful search is abandoned. If oil is found, then the right to produce becomes a vested right,
and the lessee will be protected in exercising it in accordance with the terms and conditions of his
contract.
Venture Oil Co. v. Fretts, 25 A. 732, 735 (Pa. 1893).
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Uniform Adoption of the Rule in Falcon: Policy Allows No
Alternative

Although the property right transferred in an oil and gas lease is
actually a conveyance of the estate in fee simple determinable, or in
some states, a fee simple determinable whose interest vests upon
production of gas or oil, there are strong public policy considerations
which prevent delay rentals from extending a primary term. Some of the
strongest policy arguments underlie the reasoning behind the
development of implied covenants. Policy considerations also arise
from the economic advantages of maximizing development of oil and
gas in the United States.
1. Implied Covenants
Oil and gas leases commonly contain several unstated obligations,
or covenants. 118 Usually these involve getting the land to produce gas or
oil, making the land as productive as possible, and preventing drainage
of oil or gas under one property resulting from pumping of gas or oil
from nearby properties. 119 These covenants are used in this argument
mainly as evidence of the general policy surrounding the rights of
lessors of oil or gas interests.
a. What is the Implied Covenant to Develop in Oil and Gas
Leases? 120
In Falcon, the court acknowledged that in the development of
Pennsylvania law there arose an obligation on the lessee to immediately
develop the property after the signing of a lease.121 It went on to state
that “the obligation to pay delay rentals is intended to ‘spur the lessee
toward development.’” 122 This philosophy, which is not unique to
Pennsylvania, is most commonly referred to as the implied covenant of
development, the implied covenant to test, or the implied covenant of

118. Keith B. Hall, The Continuing Role of Implied Covenants in Developing Leased Lands,
49 WASHBURN L.J. 313, 319-325 (2010).
119. Id.
120. It is important to note that the implied covenant to develop the property does not arise
until the property is found to be productive. Id. at 320. It is not being contended that the failure of a
lessee to drill during the primary term of a lease is a breach of the implied covenant of development.
121. Hite v. Falcon Partners, 13 A.3d 942, 946 (Pa. Super. 2011).
122. Id. at 948 (quoting Jacobs v. CNG Transmission Corp., 332 F. Supp. 2d 759, 789 (W.D.
Pa. 2004)).
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exploration. 123 The implied covenant of development is recognized in
some form by courts in most states. 124
b. The Effect of Delay Rental Provisions on the Implied
Covenant to Develop
In order to get around the implied covenant to develop, oil and gas
companies began executing leases that contained provisions relieving
them of the obligation to drill immediately by paying delay rental.125
Commonly, lease terms were used which would give the lessee a certain
period of time during the primary term of the lease to drill without
paying rentals to the lessor. 126 If the lessee was unable to drill during
that time, he could pay the delay rental and extend the time to drill for
another year and each subsequent year that the rental was paid. 127
Courts recognized and accepted the use of delay rental provisions,
allowing lessees to forego drilling as long as the rentals are paid. 128
However, the court in Lake v. Ohio Fuel Gas Co. 129 emphasized that
delay rental payments were created to prevent a lessor from suing for the
violation of the implied covenant to develop during the primary term
only. 130
c. Purposes Served by the Implied Covenants
Implied covenants in oil and gas leases traditionally serve three
main purposes: fill in the gaps in incomplete contracts, promote fairness
and equity, and serve public policy. 131 As this covenant applies to the
123. Hall, supra note 118, at 319-20. Some jurisdictions refer to this covenant as the “implied
covenant of reasonable development” or the implied covenant “to conduct exploratory drilling.” Id.
at 314-15. Often these different covenants have slightly different meanings in different
jurisdictions. For consistency, we will refer to this covenant as the implied covenant of
development. By using this term, we mean to refer not only to the obligation of the lessee to drill a
test well or otherwise attempt to find gas or oil on the leased premises, but also on the obligation of
the lessee to make the land profitable by developing its oil and gas interests.
124. See, e.g., Steelsmith v. Gartlan, 29 S.E. 978, 981 (W. Va. 1898) (holding that allowing a
lessor to hold onto a lease indefinitely without an obligation to develop the land while others are
clamoring at the opportunity is “unconscionable, and contrary to both right and justice”); see also
Mills v. Hartz, 94 P. 142, 143 (Kan. 1908) (stating that a lessee has a duty to develop and explore
the property within a reasonable time).
125. Lake v. Ohio Fuel Gas Co., 207 N.E.2d 659, 664 (Ohio Ct. App. 1965).
126. Hall, supra note 118, at 319.
127. Id. at 319-20.
128. Lake, 207 N.E.2d at 664.
129. 207 N.E.2d 659.
130. Id.
131. Mills v. Hartz, 94 P. 142, 143 (Kan. 1908). Hall suggests that the public policy reasoning
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extension of a lease’s primary term without any development, royalty
payments, or production, the covenant’s ability to promote fairness and
equity and serve public policy are most relevant here. In this section, we
will examine the notions of fairness and equity behind the implied
covenants. The public policies underlying the covenants are examined
in Section IV.C.(1)(d), below.
It is impossible for an oil and gas lease to account for all possible
scenarios regarding a leased property. Gas drilling is highly speculative
and uncertain. 132 At the time the lease is executed, neither party can
know the true value of the minerals, if any, that may be produced from
the premises. 133 Oil and gas leases rarely state in explicit terms that the
intentions of the parties (such as to remove, as quickly and profitably as
possible, the minerals under the leased estate) constitute limitations on
the lease. 134 Instead, the lease will often set out specific grounds for
which the lease may be canceled and grounds for such cancelation.135
However, when a lessor enters into a gas lease, his sole purpose is to
make that land profitable. 136 While delay rental might be considered by
some to be profit, it is the royalty payments to be received from the sale
of the oil and gas that serve as the true consideration for leases.137
Accordingly, “principles of fairness dictate that the lessee be obliged to
make diligent efforts to ensure that the lessor receives the benefit of his
bargain.” 138
d. The Policies behind the Implied Covenant to Develop
Landowners whose properties are tied up in unproductive leases
have an interest in having their leases canceled in order to achieve more
profitable ones. 139 In Sauder v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Co., 140 the
U.S. Supreme Court stated that the object of an oil and gas lease is to

is not widespread or well recognized. Hall, supra note 118, at 345. At least one court has
recognized that such a covenant exists as a matter of public policy. See Jacobs v. CNG
Transmission Corp., 332 F. Supp.2d 759, 784 (W.D. Pa. 2004) (holding that it is “a settled matter of
public policy” that a lessee cannot hold a lease and refuse to operate under it).
132. Gary B. Conine, Speculation, Prudent Operation, and the Economics of Oil and Gas
Law, 33 WASHBURN L.J. 670, 678 (1994).
133. Id.
134. Walker, supra note 28, at 500-01.
135. Id. at 501.
136. Hall, supra note 118, at 316.
137. Id.
138. Id. (citing Jacobs v. CNG Transmission Corp, 772 A.2d 445, 454 (Pa. 2001)).
139. Sauder v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Co., 292 U.S. 272, 280 (1934).
140. 292 U.S. 272.
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obtain a profit for both the lessor and lessee.141 In cases where delay
rental would permit an indefinite lease, the lessee would be tying up the
land for his own profit to the exclusion of the lessor by waiting until a
time arose when it would be more profitable for him to develop the land.
This tying up of the land against the rights of the lessor is referred to as
speculation. 142
“In no event is the lease to be used by the lessee for speculation.”143
This policy grows even stronger when there is a high demand for the gas
or oil under the land.144 In Steelsmith v. Gartlan, 145 the court opines that
allowing a lessor to hold onto a lease indefinitely without developing the
land while others are clamoring at the opportunity is “unconscionable,
and contrary to both right and justice.” 146 Clamoring is an appropriate
verb to describe the way in which gas companies, such as Chesapeake,
Exxon, Consol, and Marquette, are doing business, exhibiting a “gold
rush mentality” in the Marcellus states.147
With royalty payments being the main consideration for the lessor
and profitable production of oil and gas serving that function for the
lessee, the very nature of the oil and gas lease shows a joint expectation
that the property will be developed by the lessee.148 This arrangement is
advantageous to the lessor because it allows him an opportunity to make
his land profitable at no financial risk. 149 Due to the impracticability of
determining the value of oil and gas on a leasehold estate before drilling,
the royalty-based consideration also benefits the lessee by ensuring they
do not overpay for a lease that yields no producing wells. 150 In other
words, if the lessee wants to make a profit, he will develop the leasehold,
and if the lessee makes a profit, then the lessor makes a profit as well.
Different states use different standards for determining when a
lessee has violated an implied covenant of development.151 The most

141. Id.
142. Conine, supra, note 132, at 677.
143. Id. at 678.
144. Steelsmith v. Gartlan, 29 S.E. 978 (W. Va. 1898).
145. 29 S.E. at 981.
146. Id.
147. Bibikos & King, supra note 10, at 156.
148. Conine, supra note 132, at 678.
149. Id.
150. Id. While in the case of traditional vertical wells drilling a producing well was more of a
gamble, when it comes to the Marcellus “[g]eoglogists know just where to find the gas-rich shale”
taking the guesswork out of drilling and eliminating dry holes. George Hohmann, Marcellus Shale
Gas Boom Mirrors Gold Rush, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL (Nov. 25, 2011),
http://www.dailymail.com/Business/201111240048?page=2&build=cache.
151. See Bibikos & King, supra note 10, at 161 (acknowledging that most states imply the
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common standard of conduct for a lessee is the prudent operator
standard. 152 The prudent operator standard is an objective standard
requiring that the lessee act as a reasonable operator would act in similar
circumstances to protect the interests of both the lessor and lessee. 153
This standard is the equivalent of a reasonable person standard in tort
law. 154 All of the Marcellus Shale states have acknowledged or adopted
some form of the prudent operator standard when analyzing whether
there has been a breach of an implied covenant. 155 This indicates that
each of these states has acknowledged that the purpose of an oil and gas
lease is to make the land profitable for both the lessor and the lessee.
e. Balancing Equity’s Distaste for Forfeiture
Opponents to the rule laid out in Falcon are likely to argue that
courts of equity generally disfavor forfeiture of a contract.156 Indeed,
this is a policy echoed by courts, even as concerning certain issues in oil
and gas leases. 157 However, some courts find that oil and gas leases are
an exception to the rule.158 Instead, these courts hold that leases are
supposed to be construed “most strongly against the lessee.” 159 Falcon
does not address the issue of forfeiture because of its holding that the
lessor never obtained a vested fee simple determinable interest in the
estate by the end of the term specified.160
In West Virginia, which views the conveyance as a transfer of a
determinable fee simple title, the law is that the lease “terminates,
expires, or lapses” rather than being forfeited at the end of the primary
term due to the nature of the reverter.161 Both of these theories provide
strong reasons why prohibiting delay rentals from extending the primary
term of the lease does not violate the policy of courts of equity against
forfeiture of contracts. Instead, these theories state that no forfeiture

prudent operator standard).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 161-62.
154. Conine, supra note 132, at 679-80.
155. For a thorough review of the prudent operator standard, see Bibikos & King, supra note
10, at 161-63.
156. See Parish Fork Oil Co. v. Bridgewater Gas Co., 51 W. Va. 583, 658 (1902); “In general,
equity abhors a forfeiture.” Id.
157. See, e.g., Thurner v. Kaufman, 699 P.2d 435, 438 (1985) (stating that forfeiture will not
be enforced where “a less drastic remedy will satisfy the demands of justice”).
158. Masterson v. Amarillo Oil Co., 253 S.W. 908, 914-15 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923).
159. Id. at 914.
160. Hite v. Falcon Partners, 13 A.3d 942, 949 (Pa. Super. 2011).
161. McCullough Oil, Inc. v. Rezek, 346 S.E.2d 788, 795 (W. Va. 1986).
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remedy is necessary in a court of equity, but, rather, that the expiration
or termination of the lease occurs on its own. No action by the court is
necessary except to enforce the terms of the lease itself.
2. The Economic Incentive: Fracking Our Way Out of a Recession
It is no secret that the U.S. economy is in bad shape. Poverty is
booming and the unemployment rate has skyrocketed. 162 Large
government stimulus packages may have slowed the bleeding, 163 but
development and job creation is the key to healing the broken economy.
Although the development of the Marcellus Shale is still in its early
phases, the beneficial impact on the economies of the affected states has
been astronomical. 164 It is no surprise that these drilling operations
make a huge impact on local economies. Each gas well costs about $7
million dollars to construct.165 According to Hohmann, Chesapeake
Energy Corp., the biggest player in Marcellus Shale, plans to drill 252
wells in West Virginia in the next year alone. 166 At $7 million dollars
per well, this amounts to over $1.7 billion invested in the state just in
2012. With over 100,000 wells expected to be drilled in the upcoming
years and decades in Pennsylvania, the state is likely to see an
investment of over $700 billion. 167 What these huge investments mean
is that jobs will be created in these states. In fact, each new well will
create eleven to thirteen full-time jobs. 168 Additionally, some studies

162. Emily Garr, The Landscape of Recession; Unemployment and Safety Net Services Across
Urban and Suburban America, METROPOLITAN POLICY PROGRAM AT BROOKINGS, Mar. 2011, at 2,
available at http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2011/03/31-recession-garr. Since 2007, the
number of unemployed in America has risen ninety-percent. Id. at 3.
163. The U.S. Government invested hundreds of billions of dollars in tax cuts and job creation
under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Plan. David J. Lynch, Economists Agree: Stimulus
TODAY
(Aug.
30,
2010,
5:12
PM),
Created
3
Million
Jobs,
USA
http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/2010-08-30-stimulus30_CV_N.htm.
The
huge
investment seems to have been fairly successful at preventing another massive depression. Id.
Between 2.5 million and 3.6 million jobs were created and the unemployment rate dropped back to
below double digits as of late 2010. Id.
164. See Cecilia Vega, Sarah Netter, & Maggy Patrick, Boom Town: What Brings Thousands
of Jobs to One Ohio Town, ABC NEWS (Oct. 18, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/US/boom-townohio-town-sees-thousands-jobs/story?id=14761821#.Ts_uvfKwV7c (a story about an Ohio town
with an unemployment rate at fifteen percent which expects to get over 10,000 new jobs created
paying up to $77,000 per year over the next three years due to Marcellus Shale Drilling).
165. Hohmann, supra note 150.
166. Id.
167. Eliza Griswold, Situation Normal All Fracked Up, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2011, at MM44.
168. Sean D. Hamill, Scope of Marcellus Shale Drilling Job Creation a Matter of Conjecture,
POST-GAZETTE
(Mar.
29,
2012,
10:25
PM),
http://www.postPITTSBURGH
gazette.com/pg/11058/1128037-85.stm.
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have shown that the average number of jobs of different types required
to get a well operating exceeds four hundred.169
The numbers referred to above address the value of putting a lease
into production. These numbers do not account for the investments
made in purchasing leases. Due to the fluctuation and uncertainty of
bonus payments and royalty calculations,170 it is impossible to know just
how much is being invested in the Marcellus Shale. What these early
numbers do indicate, however, is that every unproductive lease that is
held by the lessee without production harms not only the lessor, but the
state and local economies as well. It seems the only person that is not
harmed financially is the lessee, who holds on to a lease at minimal
expense and enjoys the privilege of waiting for either a technological
discovery or a higher price, which would make the asset more valuable.
This economic incentive has a long-standing basis in oil and gas
law. Even a century ago, it was recognized that there is a public as well
as a private interest in bringing leased lands into production. 171 The
West Virginia Supreme Court stated that forfeiture for delay in drilling
under oil and gas lease is “essential to private and public interest in
relation to the use and alienation of property.” 172 This public interest is
even more compelling today, as the drilling of a well into the Marcellus
Shale is a multi-million dollar investment, which creates jobs and injects
millions into the state and local economies.
3. Disfavor of Delay Rental Provisions: The “Paid-Up” Lease
Oil and gas leases containing delay rental provisions are slowly
becoming outdated. Modern leases have revealed an increase in the use
of the “paid-up” lease. 173 In a “paid-up” lease, the gas company pays the
delay rental provisions in a lump-sum payment shortly after the
execution of the lease. 174 This lump-sum payment usually takes the

169. Id.
170. Current offers can range anywhere from a few hundred dollars per acre and twelve
percent royalties to over $5,000 per acre and twenty percent royalties. Elwin Green, Marcellus
Shale Could be a Boon or Bane for Land Owners, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Feb. 28, 2012,
10:11 PM), http://www.post-gazette.com/stories/business/news/marcellus-shale-could-be-a-boonor-bane-for-land-owners-235675.
171. Parish Fork Oil Co. v. Bridgewater Gas Co., 51 W. Va. 583, 658 (1902).
172. Id.
173. This “modern” trend has been growing since at least 1985. See, e.g., John S. Lowe,
Negotiating Oil and Gas Leases for the Lessee, 1-SPG NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 6, 56 (1985)
(identifying the use of “paid-up” leases as a growing trend by oil companies).
174. Kirk B. Burkley, Navigating Oil and Gas Lease Issues, 30-JUN AM. BANKR. INST. J. 18,
18 (2011).
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form of a combination of the bonus that lessors often receive for
granting a lease and the delay rental. 175 The “paid-up” lease has gained
momentum because it prevents the possibility that a gas company could
lose its rights for failure to make a delay rental payment during the
primary term. 176 The “paid-up” lease essentially removes the obligation
of the lessee to drill an exploratory well during the primary term or to
pay delay rental in the absence of such drilling, but leaves intact the
extension of the lease by production.177
The increasing popularity of the “paid-up” lease among oil and gas
companies has practical significance to the argument that delay rental
provisions should allow a lease to extend beyond the primary term.
Most importantly, by switching to the “paid-up” lease, these companies
are acknowledging that the purpose of the delay rental provision is to
compensate the lessor for the delay in drilling during the primary term
only. By the very nature of the “paid-up” lease, the delay rentals for the
entire primary term are lumped together and reflect consideration paid
for the privilege of not drilling during the primary term. 178
In turn, oil and gas companies who have switched from the old
delay rental payments to the “paid-up” lease would not have been
willing to give up the right to continue a lease beyond the primary term
by paying delay rentals. If this had been the intent, then the new “paidup” leases would not limit the power of the bonus payment to
consideration for the delay during the primary term alone. Instead, the
terms of theses leases would allow them to continue indefinitely with the
payment of subsequent rentals. The rational assumption that arises from
the actions of oil and gas companies in switching to “paid-up” leases is
that they never intended that delay rental would hold a non-producing
lease property indefinitely.
D.

Alternatives Available to the Lessee to Prevent Expiration of a
Lease

Oil and gas companies certainly would prefer to hold onto a leased
property forever without drilling, in the hopes that someday new
discoveries or technologies would make development of the property
feasible and profitable. They certainly would be opposed to an explicit

175.
176.
177.

Hall, supra note 118, at n. 61.
Lowe, supra note 173, at 56.
For an example of a “paid-up” lease, see Nancy Saint-Paul, Paid-up Oil and Gas Lease, 5
SUMMERS OIL AND GAS § 59:6 (3d ed. 2011).
178. See generally id.
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uniform law that would unconditionally limit the length of an oil and gas
lease to the primary term unless the production requirements are
satisfied. However, these profit-driven motives are not justified when
these companies have the tools and expertise necessary to prevent
ambiguity in leases and ensure their opportunity to remove minerals
from the premises beyond the initial term of the lease without violating
the rights of the lessors. Specifically, oil and gas companies can
negotiate for lease terms that give them the option of renewing the lease
at the end of the primary term, ensure that the primary term provides
them enough time to bring the premises into production, or simply bring
the property into production.
1. Renewal Clauses
It is easy to imagine why an oil and gas company would want to
enter into a lease even if the company believes it would be impossible to
drill on the property within the primary term. For the most part, these
reasons center on competition. In an area where several companies are
leasing acreage at skyrocketing prices in a limited drilling area, such as
the Appalachian region, each company is not only seeking to maximize
their own acreage, but also to prevent competitors from gaining access to
the valuable mineral deposits. In order to maximize their own
opportunities, it may be feasible for these companies to lease property
without any intention to drill. Regardless of what a company’s motives
may be, the use of an option to renew clause, or renewal option, provides
a method the company can use to tie up property that they are uncertain
they can bring to production in the first term. 179
An option to renew clause has been recognized by the Supreme
Court in Oklahoma. 180 In Silk v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 181 the court
was asked to determine whether the signature of a lessor on an “option
to renew clause” was procured by fraud. 182 The clause gave the lessee
the option of renewing the lease at the end of the primary term by paying
the same bonus to the lessor that was paid at the execution of the
lease. 183 Without specifically addressing the validity of the option to
renew clause, the court found that it was not procured by fraud and
179. See generally 49 AM. JUR. 2D LANDLORD AND TENANT § 141 (2012). This explanation
focuses on landlord and tenant law. In fact, there is not much law regarding the use of renewal
option provisions in oil and gas leases.
180. See generally Silk v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 760 P.2d 174 (Okla. 1988).
181. 760 P.2d 174.
182. Id. at 177.
183. Id.
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upheld the lessee’s exercise of the option. 184
In commercial and real estate law, there are abundant sources of
law validating the use of renewal provisions.185 It is important to
acknowledge that oil and gas law is a distinct area of law, so much so
that academics are reluctant to classify renewal provisions in oil and gas
leases with other types of renewal provisions.186 Although renewal
clauses in oil and gas leases are not as established as in other areas of
law, courts have generally accepted the use of these provisions. 187 In
fact, renewal clauses are now so common that standard renewal forms
can easily be found on legal databases. 188 Based on the acceptance of
these provisions in other states and areas of law, it is likely that New
York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia will uphold the use of
renewal provisions. 189
Renewal provisions in oil and gas leases can be used by oil and gas
companies to retain their interests in oil and gas leases beyond the initial
term. Using this tool, companies that are willing to pay lessors bonuses
multiple times 190 can maximize their production in shale gas formations.

184. Id. at 181.
185. See, e.g., Daniel E. Feld, Validity and Enforceability of Provision for Renewal of Lease at
Rental to be Fixed by Subsequent Agreement of Parties, 58 A.L.R.3D 500 (1974). This article
presents just one aspect of renewal clauses addressed in the American Law Reports. A simple
search of the A.L.R. with keywords “renewal clause” or “renewal provision” reveals dozens of
articles dealing with specific aspects of renewal clauses.
186. See Jay M. Zitter, Sufficiency of Provision of Lease to Effect Second or Perpetual Right
of Renewal, 29 A.L.R.4TH 172, n. 2 (1984) (stating that oil and gas leases are of a “distinctive type”
and refusing to include them in an analysis of renewal provisions).
187. See Silk v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 760 P.2d 174, 181 (Okla. 1988) (finding that separate
consideration is not necessary when an option is incorporated into the lease agreement); APC
Operating P’ship v. Mackey, 841 F.2d 1031, 1033 (10th Cir. 1988) (holding that tender of
consideration for renewal by mail was sufficient though not explicitly authorized by lease).
188. See, e.g., William B. Burford, Extension and Renewal Clause, 7 WEST’S TEX. FORMS,
MINERALS, OIL & GAS § 11:13 (2011).
189. Courts in each of these states have dealt with renewal provisions in other areas of the law
and generally approved their use. See Thaw v. Gaffney, 83 S.E. 983, 984 (W. Va. 1914) (finding
that provisions allowing perpetual oil and gas leases based on production justify the perpetual
renewal of a lease for real property); Kern v. Clear Creek Oil Co., 778 N.E.2d 115, 120 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2002) (approving of Ahmed v. Scott, 418 N.E.2d 406 (Ohio App. 1979), which terminated a
real property lease when lessee failed to timely exercise the option to renew); Hite v. Falcon
Partners, 13 A.3d 942, 946 (Pa. Super. 2011) (identifying the option to renew as a predecessor to the
modern habendum clause); American Power Indus., Ltd. v. Rebel Realty Corp., 53 N.Y.S.2d 99,
100 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (enforcing an option to renew in a commercial lease even though lessee
was two months late in notifying lessor of his exercise of the option).
190. It is important to note that courts are reluctant to enforce renewal of leases more than
once. See, e.g., Howard v. Schildberg Const. Co., Inc., 528 N.W.2d 550, 555 (Iowa 1995) (holding
that a renewal provision “is satisfied by one renewal, unless further renewals are expressly provided
for”).
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Therefore, oil and gas companies that would argue that payment of delay
rental should extend their leases beyond the primary term can achieve
virtually the same result by drafting clear leases that allow for a renewal.
This would preserve the right of the lessee to delay developing property
for some period of time, while at the same time ensuring that the lessor
is fairly compensated for any excessive delays. However, if renewal
provisions become contrary to public policy, 191 these provisions could
become subject to the same scrutiny that perpetual delay rental
provisions now receive.
2. How Long Should the Primary Term Last?
In examining oil and gas leases, it quickly becomes apparent that
the length of the primary term varies widely. In Falcon, the primary
term was for one year. 192 In the hypothetical lease discussed above, the
primary term was five years. 193 It is not uncommon for the primary term
of a lease to endure for ten 194 or even twenty-five years. 195 This variation
brings to mind two important questions. First, why would an oil and gas
company agree to a lease term of five, ten, or twenty five years if it was
possible to have a one year lease term and then have merely an option to
extend the lease by paying delay rental payments? This question
necessarily leads one to wonder how long a primary term should last.
These issues are addressed in turn below.
The inconsistency of primary terms of leases entered into by oil and
gas companies reflects an acknowledgement by these companies that a
lease expires when the production requirements have not been satisfied
at the end of the primary term. It would not make sense for a gas
company to agree to a primary term of ten years, during which they
would be required to pay delay rental, when the same result could be
accomplished by executing a one-year lease. If production was not
accomplished during the first year, the company could continue to pay
delay rental and bind the lessor to the lease as long as the company saw
fit. The existence of longer primary terms clearly shows the intent of
both lessors and lessees that the term of the lease cannot be extended
absent a prior agreement or production.
One solution available to oil and gas companies regarding this issue

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
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Supra Section IV.A.
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is to base their decisions on how long to make a primary term on the
realistic likelihood that they can get the land into production by the end
of that term. While the original consideration required to execute a
longer lease will be greater, so will the benefit to both parties.
Obviously, ensuring that they have adequate time to drill a producing
well will reduce the risk of forfeiting leased property due to the
expiration of the term. Additionally, the longer duration will reduce the
probability that the oil and gas company will have to pay the lessor
multiple times for renewal of the lease.
3. Fulfilling the Object of the Lease: Production in Paying
Quantities
It is customary for the habendum clause of an oil and gas lease to
provide language that extends the lease for the primary term and “as
long thereafter as oil or gas or either of them is produced from the
Property.” 196 If every leased property was brought into production by
the end of the primary term, the question of whether delay rental could
be used to extend the lease would become moot. While a world in
which every gas lease resulted in production may be a fairy tale,
production requirements make this aspiration more of a reality in
Marcellus Shale states. 197 In today’s era of hydraulic fracturing, there
are many ways in which lessees can satisfy the production requirements,
or at least prolong the expiration of the lease.198 Chief among these
methods of producing are commencement clauses, pooling provisions,
and continuous operations clauses. 199
In some instances, satisfaction of a commencement clause will
allow a lessee to continue operations after the primary term of a lease
expires without production. 200 The commencement clause, which can
vary greatly, basically provides that if a lessee commences drilling
operations within the primary term of the lease, the lease will be
extended so long as drilling continues. 201 In some jurisdictions, merely
196. Falcon, 13 A.3d at 944.
197. It is unrealistic to think that every gas well drilled will produce. Nearly half of all gas
wells drilled through 1998 resulted in a dry hole. Thaddeus S. Dyman & Troy A. Cook, Summary
of Deep Oil and Gas Wells in the United States through 1998, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, DEP. OF
THE INTERIOR 3 (1998), http://pubs.usgs.gov/dds/dds-067/CHB.pdf.
198. See generally Bruce M. Kramer, Keeping Leases Alive in the Era of Horizontal Drilling
and Hydraulic Fracturing: Are the Old Workhorses (Shut-in, Continuous Operations, and Pooling
Provisions) Up to the Task?, 49 Washburn L.J. 283 (2010).
199. See generally id.
200. Id. at 296.
201. Nancy Saint-Paul, What Constitutes Commencement of Drilling, 2 SUMMERS OIL AND
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bringing in materials to begin the drilling process will be enough to
satisfy the commencement clause, but others require that the drilling
operations reflect a showing of good faith development by the lessee. 202
Regardless of whether actual drilling is required for commencement,
carefully drafted leases can afford lessees more time to complete wells
under a lease.
Another option available for the lessee is the use of a pooling
clause. A pooling clause is part of a lease that allows the lessee to
combine the acreage of a certain lease with others without the lessor’s
consent. 203 Often, these pooled units are required to be approved by a
governmental entity before the drilling may begin. 204 Pooling provisions
are especially important in shale drilling due to the huge range of
acreage that can be reached from a single horizontal drilling site. 205 This
tool can be particularly useful to oil and gas companies because
production of oil or gas from any portion of the lands pooled together is
considered production from each of the parcels involved in the unit.206
Cleverly created units can allow oil and gas companies to maximize
production on their pooling units while ensuring that landowners entitled
to royalties reap the benefits of production.207
GAS § 15:19 (3d ed. 2011).
202. Compare Santa Fe Drilling Co., Inc. v. Moore, No. 82 X 15, 1983 WL 2278, at *3 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1983) (holding that lessee that had paid delay rental and conferred with lessor about
drilling sites could continue operations after the expiration of the primary term although drilling had
not begun) and Todd v. Mfrs.’ Light & Heat Co., 110 S.E. 446, 447 (W. Va. 1922) (holding that
drilling which commenced three months before the expiration of the ten year primary term satisfied
the commencement clause extending the lease) and Henderson v. Ferrell, 38 A. 1018, 1019 (Pa.
1898) (upholding a jury determination that lessee who entered the property on the last day of the
primary term and drove a stake into the ground to mark well site and lumber delivery mark had
commenced drilling operations in good faith) with Gisinger v. Hart, 184 N.E.2d 240, 241 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1961) (rejecting the argument of the lessee under a ten year primary term lease who
commenced drilling operations four days before the expiration of the term) and Street v. Masterson,
277 S.W. 407, 407-08 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925) (holding that employees of lessee who drilled eighteen
to twenty feet using a rig used to drill water wells with the intent to hold the lease until “hell freezes
over,” did not commence drilling operations in good faith).
203. Kramer, supra note 198, at 286.
204. Id. at 288.
205. Id. at 291. Due to the horizontal nature of hydraulic fracturing, one vertical well location
can result in a well that travels through several tracks. Id. Each of these tracts of land contributes to
the production. Id.
206. Id. at 293. Courts are often reluctant to enforce pooled units when the unit is created
shortly before the expiration of the primary term of leases involved. Id. Understandably,
skepticism arises when it appears that a unit has been created simply to hold leases which are about
to expire. Id.
207. It is important to note that many states limit the size of a pooling unit to 640 acres plus a
ten percent drainage area. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 22C-9-8 (West 2013); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV.
LAW § 23-0501 (McKinney 2008); TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 32.202 (West 2013).
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An operations clause is very similar to a commencement clause, but
it can be an even broader way for a lessee to preserve its interest in an oil
and gas lease. 208 Kramer acknowledges that the “‘immature’ oil and gas
jurisprudence” of the Midwest states that make up the shale gas plays
makes it unclear how these states will interpret operations clauses. 209
However, as long as the clauses are specific about what “operations” are
required to keep a lease in effect and the lessee moves forward with the
operations in good faith, the lease should be extended as long as the
operations continue. 210 In this way, a lease may be kept alive even if
development of a property is only in the planning or preparation
phases. 211
Used alone or in conjunction, the commencement clause, pooling
clause, and operations clause provide just three examples of alternatives
available to oil and gas lessees which help ensure that the lessee can reap
the fruits of the lease without violating the interests of the lessor. These
provisions help to avoid the confounded reasoning by lessees that delay
rental provisions should be construed to perpetuate leases. Carefully
crafted leases that are unambiguous and well-explained to lessors should
help to clarify the responsibilities of oil and gas companies and the
expectations of landowners.
V. CONCLUSION
Driving through the hills of southeastern Ohio, it is clear that there
is something important going on. In the local gas stations and
convenience stores there is a buzz about economic development and
jobs. County roads that are usually empty are packed with trucks with
Texas license plates, tanker trucks, and tractor-trailers hauling drilling
equipment. At night, the usual quiet darkness is interrupted by the bright
lights of drilling rigs off in the distance and the unusual rumblings of
machinery. This is the landscape in the areas overlying the Marcellus
and Utica shale. Amid all of the excitement and urgency in accessing
the valuable resources below the earth, important legal issues have
arisen. To landowners tied up in decades-old leases, none of these issues
are more important than whether they will be fairly compensated for
their mineral rights.
208. See Kramer, supra note 198, at 301 (explaining that in some cases, operations that take
place off of the leased premises which are intended to help get the leased premises producing can
satisfy the operations clause).
209. Id.
210. Id. at 302-03.
211. Id. at 302.
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While each Marcellus state has some idea of how it will handle
issues related to delay rental, it is in the interests of both lessors and
lessees for these states to come up with a definite, explicit, and wellreasoned conclusion. Principles of fairness, reflected through public
policy and precedent led to the decision in Hite v. Falcon Partners that
oil and gas companies will not be allowed to profit from speculation and
lack of development of mineral rights to the detriment of the owner of
the surface. The very nature of the property right transferred in an oil
and gas lease aligns with the policy reasoning and provides further
evidence that the Falcon court came to the right conclusion. The
availability of alternative lease provisions and the proliferation of the
“paid-up” lease serve only to strengthen the argument. Delay rental
provisions are intended to compensate lessors for the right to postpone
drilling during the primary term, and at the expiration of that term,
further payment of delay rentals will not extend an oil and gas lease.
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